There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collusion. To examine this concern, we exploit the fact that leniency programs (LPs) are generally recognized as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements and study the effect that the introduction of an LP has on horizontal MS acquisitions. Using data from 63 countries over the period 1990-2013, we find a large increase in horizontal MS acquisitions in the year in which an LP is introduced, especially in large rivals. The effect is present however only in countries with an effective antitrust enforcement and low levels of corruption and only when the acquisitions involve stakes of 10% − 20%. These results suggest that MS acquisitions may stabilize collusive agreements that were destabilized by the introduction of the LP.
the competitive externality it imposes on the rival. 5 The anticompetitive effects of MS acquisitions could be even larger if the acquisition gives the acquirer some degree of control over the target firm, because then the acquirer can also soften the target's behavior in addition to its own behavior.
In fact, Salop and O'Brien (2000) argue that MS acquisitions could lead to even less competitive outcomes than full horizontal mergers if the acquirer's control rights substantially exceed its cash 1 There is also a growing concern about common ownership: cases where the same set of shareholders own several competing firms. Recent papers by Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2016), and Azar, Raina, and Schmalz (2016) show that airline ticket prices and bank fees are significantly higher when competing firms are held by the same institutional investors, such as Berkshire Hathaway, BlackRock, and Vanguard. Panayides and Thomas (2017) study data from 119 U.S. industries over the period 1997-2014 and find that common ownership by institutional investors (blockholders) is associated with higher industry profitability, due to reduced expenditures. 2 In some countries including Austria, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.S., and the UK, competition authorities have the competence to review MS acquisitions that raise competition concerns. See European Commission (2014). For a comprehensive review of antitrust policies concerning MS acquisitions, see Fotis and Zevgolis (2016) .
3 Gilo (2000) argues that the lenient approach towards passive investments in rivals in the U.S. stems from the courts' interpretation of the exemption for stock acquisitions "solely for investment" included in Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 4 See European Commission (2013) and O'Brien and Waehrer (2017) for recent literature surveys. 5 Interestingly, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show that in the context of a Cournot model, the acquirer's softer behavior induces rivals to expand their output; if rivals are more efficient than the acquirer, the output shift can actually enhance welfare. Brito, Cabral and Vasconcelos (2014) study the welfare effects of different forms of a divestiture of a firm's partial ownership in a rival. flow rights. 6 Malueg (1992), Dietzenbacher, Smid, and Volkerink (2000) , and Gilo, Moshe, and Spiegel (2006) show that MS acquisitions can also facilitate tacit collusion. The reason is that when firms hold MS in rivals, they internalize part of the negative competitive externality that they impose on rivals when they deviate from a collusive agreement. Although MS may also soften competition once a collusive agreement breaks down and hence weaken the incentive to collude, the first effect typically dominates, so firms have a stronger incentive to collude. 7, 8 Despite the increasing concern about the competitive effects of MS acquisitions, empirical evidence on these effects is still scarce. Dietzenbacher, Smid, and Volkerink (2000) use cross ownership data from the Dutch financial sector to calibrate oligopoly models with constant marginal costs. They conclude that the price-cost margins in the Dutch financial sector are 8% higher in a Cournot model and 2% higher in a differentiated goods, price competition, model than they would be absent cross-ownership. Brito, Ribeiro, and Vasconcelos (2014) propose a methodology to evaluate the unilateral effects of partial cross ownership and apply it to several MS acquisitions in the wet shaving industry. Among other things, they estimate that Gillette's acquisition of a 22.9% nonvoting equity interest in Wilkinson Sword in 1990 had only a negligible negative effect on prices, but a counterfactual acquisition of a 22.9% voting equity would have led to a 2.1% − 2.7% increase in the price of Wilkinson Sword wet shaving razor blades. Nain and Wang (2016) find in a study of 774 horizontal MS acquisitions in U.S. manufacturing industries announced in 1980-2010 that the acquisitions raised prices by 2% and raised price-cost margins by 0.7%, even after controlling for other factors that may have affected prices and price cost margins.
In this paper, we wish to shed light on the competitive effects of MS acquisitions and in particular, examine whether they facilitate collusion. As far as we know, there is still no empirical evidence on the effects of MS acquisitions on the ability of firms to collude (tacitly or explicitly).
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that it is generally accepted that leniency programs (LP), which offer amnesty from government penalties to corporations and individuals who come forward and disclose information about illegal antitrust activity, such as price-fixing, and fully cooperate with subsequent investigations, can destabilize collusive agreements. Indeed, following the U.S. lead in 1993, many countries have introduced an LP precisely in order to detect existing cartels and deter new collusive agreements. 9 Hence, once an LP is introduced, firms would need to stabilize 6 Intuitively, the acquirer may then have an incentive to use his control rights to soften the target's behavior (by setting high prices or low quantities) in order to boost the profits of his own firm. The resulting outcome could be less competitive than under a full horizontal merger, where the acquirer cares equally about the profits of both firms. Foros, Kind, and Shaffer (2011) show that when the acquirer fully controls the target, a partial ownership stake may be more profitable than full ownership because then the acquirer chooses a softer stragety for the target than under full ownership. If the two firms compete with a rival and strategies are strategic complements, the rival also softens its behavior in a way that may benefit the acquirer.
7 Malueg (1992) shows in a symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which firms hold the same ownership stakes, v, in one another, that the second effect may dominate the first, in which case an increase in v hinders collusion rather than facilitates it. But if this were the case, firms would not wish to increase v, so we should not observe such an outcome. 8 While MS typically soften competition, they may also have a bright side. Lopez and Vives (2016) (general oligopoly model with symmetric cross or common ownership structure) and Shelegia and Spiegel (2016) (Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric cross-ownership structure) show that MS in rivals may encourage cost-reducing investments.
9 For a review of LPs in different countries, see OECD (2012) and UNCTAD (2010).
their collusive agreements; acquiring MS in rivals is one way of doing it. Accordingly, we examine whether the introduction of an LP encourages MS acquisitions.
To this end, we construct a panel data set that covers 63 countries, of which 54 have introduced a national LP between 1990 and 2013. Applying count data models, we find robust evidence that in the year in which a national LP is introduced in a given country, there is a large and significant increase in the number and volume of horizontal MS acquisitions between firms based in that country. This effect holds, however, only in countries with an effective antitrust enforcement and a low level of corruption. Otherwise, the introduction of an LP has no significant effect on MS acquisitions, presumably because the national LP is not perceived by colluding firms as an effective threat. We also find that the effect is present when investing in large firms and when the acquired stake gives the acquirer a 10% − 20% share in the target firm; such stakes are significant in size, but normally do not trigger merger notification.
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Following the pioneering paper of Motta and Polo (2003) , a large and growing theoretical and experimental literature has emerged which examines the competitive effects of LPs (see Spagnolo and Marvao (2016) for a recent literature review). This literature shows that LPs affect competition in several ways and that in general they hinder collusion. In Harrington (2008) , an LP has three distinct effects on collusion: the "Deviator Amnesty" effect hinders collusion because it allows a deviating firm to apply for leniency at the same time it undercuts the collusive price and hence it lowers the cost of cheating. The "Race to the Courthouse" effect destabilizes collusive agreements because each firm is concerned that another cartel member would apply for leniency and hence it is better off doing so first. Finally, the "Cartel Amnesty" effect is a countervailing force since the ability of each firm to apply for leniency in the future, if needed, lowers the cost of joining the cartel in the first place. 11 Harrington shows that when an LP is optimally designed, the first two effects dominate the third, meaning that LPs hinder collusion. Harrington and Chang (2009) explore the interaction between the three effects of LPs in the context of a dynamic model in which cartels form and collapse on the equilibrium path. They show that the introduction of an LP reduces the longrun frequency of cartels and raises the rate at which they are discovered. Harrington (2013) shows that when each cartel member has private information about the likelihood that the competition authority will be able to convict the cartel without a cooperating firm, an LP can also destabilize the cartel due to a "Preemption" effect, which arises because each firm fears that another firm may believe that the probability of detection is high, and will apply for amnesty. Hence, firms may wish to apply for amnesty to preempt rivals from doing so. 10 See OECD (2008): in most countries, an MS acquisition triggers the requirement for a merger notification only when it results in joint control, i.e., the right to block major decisions within the target.
11 Polo and Motta (2003) also show that an LP might, under some conditions, facilitate collusion because the possibility of reporting and receiving immunity from fines reduces the expected costs of cartel detection and conviction. Likewise, Harrington and Chang (2013) find that an LP can result in more cartels, although they identify situations and policies a competition authority can pursue that make it more likely that an LP will hinder collusion.
significantly negative effect on the duration of detected cartels. 12 Miller (2009) develops a theoretical model of cartel behavior and uses it to identify the effect of a LP on cartel formation and detection rates. He finds that the number of cartel discoveries increased immediately after a new LP was introduced in the U.S. in August 1993, but then fell below initial levels. The latter is consistent with the notion that LPs deter cartel formation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our empirical strategy and in Section 3 we present our data. The estimation results are in Section 4 and in Section 5 we show robustness checks. We conclude in Section 6. The Appendix contains additional tables that are not included in the main text.
Empirical Strategy
To examine empirically the effects of MS on collusion, we will use the introduction of a national LP in a given country as an exogenous shock, which destabilize collusive agreements between firms located in that country. The idea is that faced with this negative shock, colluding firms may wish to resort to MS acquisition, as a way to stabilize their collusive agreements. While firms may use MS as a collusive device even before an LP is in place, an MS acquisition is typically costly due to various transaction costs, and if the shares are acquired from atomistic shareholders, the acquirer makes no money on the acquired shares. 13 Consequently, it is reasonable to expect firms to be reluctant to acquire MS in rivals if they have other means to sustain collusion. Since the introduction of an LP destabilizes collusive agreements, it makes firms more willing to acquire MS in rivals, which suggests in turn that the introduction of a national LP would be followed by an increase in MS acquisitions in rival firms. If the intention of firms is only to stabilize existing agreements, the increase in MS acquisitions would be immediate and short-term. If the intention is to facilitate new collusive agreements, we should observe a permanent increase in MS acquisitions following the introduction of an LP.
The idea of using the introduction of an LP as a negative shock to collusive agreements was first used by Sovinsky and Helland (2012 
where M S it is a measure of MS acquisitions of rivals in country i in year t, LP it is a vector of dummies several years before and after year t in which an LP was introduced in country i, X it is a vector of macroeconomic and financial markets control variables, ξ i is country fixed effect, ξ t is a year fixed effect, and ε it is a noise term. In some specifications we replace
where Y i reflects two country-specific indices that control for the efficacy of antitrust enforcement and the level of corruption in country i. We control for these factors because in countries with ineffective antitrust enforcement and/or high levels of corruption, an LP is unlikely to destabilize collusive agreements, and hence may not trigger the need to resort to MS acquisitions. We therefore expect to see more MS acquisitions following the introduction of LPs only in countries with effective antitrust enforcement and/or low levels of corruption.
We include the vector X it in our estimation to control, at least partially, for various forces that may drive MS acquisitions beside the desire to soften competition. For example, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986) study UK data and find that about 25% of all MS are acquired as a first step in a planned takeover or to block a takeover by a third party, 15% are due to diversification motives into new sectors, and about 30% are intended to support trading agreements. 15 Allen and Phillips (2000) and Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) show that MS can mitigate incomplete contracts and thereby facilitate cooperation between independent firms, while Parker Ouimet (2013) finds that MS acquisitions are more common when it is efficient to keep the target's managerial incentives intact, and when the acquirer wishes to provide the target with financing or certify it to outside investors.
We wish to examine whether the introduction of a national LP has an effect on MS acquisitions even after these additional forces are controlled for.
In general, a count data model could be estimated with a (Quasi-Maximum Likelihood)
Poisson model or with a Negative Binomial model. The Poisson model however is inappropriate for our data since we have significant Poisson overdispersion: when estimated by Poisson, the resulting they examine merger after cartel breakdowns rather than after the introduction of an LP. Using a pooled sample of 84 European cartels, they find that mergers are more frequent post-cartel breakdown, especially in less concentrated markets. This finding is consistent with the notion that mergers are an attempt to re-establish collusive behavior, although they may be also driven by other considerations, such as the need for market restructuring, due to more intense post-cartel competition. 15 Jovanovic and Wey (2014) study a model in the MS acquisition is a first step towards a full merger.
conditional variance is approximately four times larger than the variance implied by a Poisson distribution. 16 We will therefore apply negative binomial estimation. This choice is supported by model fit test presented in Tables A1a and A1b in the Appendix.
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A potential source for the observed overdispersion is the fact that 30% of all observations in our data are zeros, i.e., country-year pairs without any MS acquisitions. This fraction of zeros is higher than assumed by Poisson and even higher than assumed by negative binomial models. It is possible that at least some of the zeros in our data are "false zeros" and are due to imperfect data reporting, especially in smaller and developing countries. Moreover, it is highly likely that data collection has improved over time so we have more false zeros in earlier years. To account for the problem we will therefore use a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model, which, in addition to the count component that estimates the full range of the counts, also contains a binary component that estimates the probability of excess zeros. The binary component, sometimes called the inflation equation, is conventionally computed using the following logit process:
where Z it is a vector of variables that may or may not coincide with variables used in the count component. 18 In our case, we include in Z it three time dummies, for the periods 1990-1995, 1996-2000, and 2000-2013, as well as real GDP, real GDP per capita, and the size of the stock market.
The last three variables are meant to capture the degree to which the country is developed, since we expect more developed countries to have fewer false zeros due to data collection problems. 19 The tests presented in Tables A1a and T1b in the Appendix indicate that the ZINB model fits the data best. In the Appendix we also present results for the standard negative binomial models (without zero-inflation); these models also provide a good fit to the data, though the results are similar to the ZINB models presented in the main text.
The Data
We constructed the data set used to study the relationship between the introduction of a national LP and MS acquisitions in several steps, outlined in Table A2 in the Appendix. First, we extracted from Thomson One Financial database information on all acquisitions with a final stake under 50% in 63 countries for the period 1990-2013. Second, we eliminated acquisitions for which the final stake is unknown to ensure that we only study MS acquisitions. Third, we eliminated share buybacks and self-tenders, i.e., acquisitions where the acquirer and target are one and the same. In the fourth and fifth steps, we eliminated acquisitions where the acquirer or target are investors and investment offices according to their primary business description. These acquisitions are likely to be driven by investment considerations, which are unrelated to the issue that we focus on in this paper. Sixth, we eliminated from most of our analysis cross-border acquisitions, because in such acquisitions it is not clear which competition authority is in charge and hence which LP is relevant. Seventh, we also eliminated from most of our analysis non-horizontal acquisitions. An acquisition is classified as horizontal if the listed activities of the acquirer (or its parent company) and the target overlap in at least one 4-digit SIC code. Without an overlap, we classify the transaction as non-horizontal.
Our final data covers 14, 112 domestic horizontal MS acquisitions, of which 11, 714 are new MS acquisitions, and 2, 398 are increases of an already existing MS. In some of our robustness checks, we will also examine domestic non-horizontal MS and cross-border horizontal MS. . 20 In our analysis, we will therefore include time fixed effects to control for these trends. 20 The increasing trend in the data might be due to improvements in the scope and quality of the used database.
Of the countries in our data, the U.S. accounts for the largest aggregate volume of transac- The first countries to introduce an LP were the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. After 2000, we see a significant increase in the introduction of LPs, with at least three countries introducing an LP each year. The peak was reached in 2004, with nine countries adopting an LP that year.
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As mentioned earlier, an LP may be ineffective in countries with weak antitrust enforcement and high levels of corruption. If so, the introduction of an LP should have no effect on MS acquisitions in such countries. To control for the efficacy of antitrust enforcement, we use the Anti-Monopoly Policy Index (AMPI), provided by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and published annually in the Global Competition Review (GCR). 22 The AMPI is based on a survey of top business executives regarding their perception of the efficacy of antimonopoly policy in their particular country and 21 The EU has introduced an LP in 1996 and revised in in 2002 and 2006. In this paper however we only focus on national LP's. Including the EU's LP and its revisions in the regressions does not change our qualitative results. 22 The AMPI is part of a much broader Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which can be downloaded at http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/rankings/ (last accessed on 24 June 2017). For the construction of AMPI, we use the variable "6.03 Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy."
varies from 1 (not effective at all) to 7 (extremely effective). The average AMPI values for the countries in our data set are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. Although the AMPI is based on a single survey question and hence is unlikely to capture different dimensions of competition law and policy, we chose it over other popular measures, such as the GCR Rating Enforcement measure (RE), 23 because of its wide coverage, which allows us to include it for 62 out of 63 countries in our data. Despite its simplicity, the AMPI is highly correlated with the RE measure, with a correlation coefficient of 0.7. We therefore believe that the AMPI is a sensible measure of antitrust enforcement.
Since the AMPI is only available from 2006 onwards, we divide countries into two groups, We control for corruption using the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), computed annually by Transparency International (TI). The CPI is based on survey-type assessments by analysts, businessmen, and experts and reflects the perceived level of corruption in the public sectors of their country. It rates countries on a 10 points scale, with a higher score reflecting a lower level of corruption. 24 The average CPI values for the countries in our data set are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. Unfortunately, we do not have CPI scores for all country-year pairs since CPI were originally available only for 28 countries out of the 63 countries in our sample and is available only for 42 countries from 2003 onwards. We therefore exploit the fact that the CPI for each country is stable over time, and as in the AMPI case, classify countries as having either a low or a high level of corruption, depending on whether their average CPI scores are below or above the median for all countries.
To control for other potential determinants of MS acquisitions, we collected country-specific macroeconomic variables, including GDP growth, real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, inflation rate (based on the GDP deflator index), and the purchasing-power-parity conversion rate (PPPEX).
These variables were shown to be potential drivers of mergers and acquisitions (see, e.g., Rossi and In addition to the macroeconomic control variables, we also include in the analysis countryspecific financial markets variables from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). 23 The RE measure is based on a detailed questionnaire filled by the competition authorities themselves (e.g. size of the authority, their methodologies for setting priorities and ensuring transparency as well as a detailed breakdown of the number and the handling of merger filings and their cartel and abuse of dominance work). In addition, the RE measure also considers how local competition counsels, antitrust lawyers and economists, academics, and local journalists evaluate an agency's performance. However, the RE measure is only available for a fraction of the countries used in our analysis. 24 For further information on the CPI, see http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (last accessed on 24 June 2017).
These variables include the total market capitalization of listed firms as a share of the GDP to control for the size of the stock market (STOCK); domestic credit to private sector as a share of the GDP to control for the availability of credit (CREDIT); the trade ratio as the share of total imports and exports in GDP to control for trade activity (TRADE); and the real interest rate, which is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation, to control for the real cost of investment (INTEREST).
Unfortunately, the financial markets variables (and especially CREDIT and INTEREST) are not available for all country-year pairs and hence when we use them, our sample is reduced from 1, 368 to 1, 018 country-year pairs. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our variables, reported on an annual basis. 
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Before moving to the estimation results, we first illustrate in Figure 3 the evolution of the number and aggregate volume of domestic horizontal MS acquisitions from three years before the introduction of a national LP to three years after. To make the data comparable across countries, we normalize the data for each country to values between 0 and 1, as follows:
, 
Estimation Results
We present our estimation results for the number of new domestic MS acquisitions in rivals and their aggregate deal volumes Tables 2 and 3 below. The results are obtained from ZINB estimation. In the online Appendix, we present corresponding results from negative binomial estimation; the results are very similar to those in Tables 2 and 3 . In all specifications, we include country and year fixed effects. In most of the paper we only focus on new MS acquisitions in domestic rivals. Including increases of already existing MS shareholdings in rivals, yields very similar results, especially for the number of MS acquisitions. The results for this case are also in the online Appendix. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 show that the number of new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions increases significantly by 26% − 30% in the year in which an LP was introduced.
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Note that Column (1) does not include the financial market variables, which are not available for all country-year pairs, and therefore has more observations. Yet the results in Columns (1) and (2) are very similar. The increase in the number of new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions is consistent with the idea that firms acquires MS in rivals to stabilize collusive arrangements that were destabilized by the introduction of an LP. Alternatively, it could be that firms anticipate that the LP will lead to a collapse of their collusive agreement, so they acquire MS in rivals in order to make the non-collusive equilibrium that will prevail less competitive.
In Column (5) we examine this issue further by replacing the before/after LP year dummies with a single "After LP" dummy that takes the value 1 in all years after an LP was introduced and 0 otherwise (including the year in which the LP was introduced). The idea is to examine whether an LP has a permanent effect on MS acquisitions. It turns out, however, that the "After LP" dummy is not significant, suggesting that the effect of LP on MS is indeed limited to the year at which the LP was introduced. A potential reason for this is that an LP may deter new cartels from being formed, and hence firms do not need to acquire MS in rivals either. Yet, firms need to stabilize their existing collusive agreements once an LP is introduced, and hence they respond quickly to the introduction of the LP by acquiring MS in the year in which the LP is first introduced.
In Columns (3) and (4), we interact the LP dummy with the AMPI and the CPI to control for the efficacy of antitrust enforcement. Since the AMPI and CPI are not available for all countryyear pairs, we have fewer observations in Columns (3) and especially (4). The results show that the effect of the introduction of an LP on MS acquisitions is limited to countries with effective antitrust enforcement and low levels of corruption. The effect in these countries is in fact much larger than it is for the entire set of countries: the number of MS acquisitions in these countries is 42% − 51%
higher in the year an LP is introduced than in other years. 27 The finding that the introduction of an LP affects MS acquisitions only in countries with effective antitrust enforcement and low levels of corruption is consistent with the idea that when antitrust enforcement is weak and/or the level of corruption is high, an LP is either unlikely to be effective in destabilizing collusive agreements or collusion is feasible even without the need to acquire MS in rivals. Hence, the introduction of an LP has no effect on new MS acquisitions in such countries.
We now turn to the aggregate deal volume of new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions. The results are presented in Table 3 . 26 The exponentiated coefficients of 0.23 in Column (1) and 0.26 in Column (2) are 1.26 and 1.30, and therefore represent an increase of 26% and 30% in MS acquisitions in the year an LP was introduced. 27 The exponentiated coefficients of 0.35 in Column (3) and 0.41 in Column (4) are 1.42 and 1.51. The results in Table 3 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2 . The coefficients of the leniency dummy in Columns (1) and (2) indicate a 75% − 103% increase in the aggregate deal volume of domestic horizontal MS acquisitions in the year at which the LP is introduced. 28 Moreover,
Column (2) shows that the aggregate deal volume of MS acquisitions also increases in the first year after the introduction of the LP.
Note that the LP coefficient is much larger in Table 3 than in Table 2 , indicating that the introduction of an LP has a much larger effect on the deal volume of MS acquisitions than on their sheer number. That is, after an LP is in place, firms pay on average more money for MS stakes in rivals. There are two potential reasons for this: (i) firms may buy larger stakes in rivals once an LP is introduced and hence they pay more, and (ii) firms may acquire stakes in larger rivals, which require higher payments.
Before we examine this issue in detail, we first take a closer look at the size of MS stakes that firms acquire. To this end, we split the MS acquisitions in our data into five groups, depending on the size of the acquired stake: up to 10%, 10% − 20%, 20% − 30%, 30% − 40%, and 40% − 50%. Table 4 shows the distribution of MS acquisitions by the size of the acquired stake in millions of USD. Table 4 shows that the number of new MS acquisitions and their volume are by and large evenly split among the five groups, though acquisitions of 10% − 20% stakes are more common than acquisitions of large stakes of 30% or more. With MS increases, the majority of acquisitions are of less than 20% and especially less than 10%. 29 Since we restrict attention to financial stakes under 50%, the latter result is not surprising since the acquired stakes are constrained by the size of the exsisting stakes (for example, a firm that already holds 20% in a rival can acquire at most 30% without turning its stake into a majority stake). 28 The exponentiated coefficients of 0.56 in Column (1) and 0.71 in Column (2) are equal to 1.75 and 2.03. 29 If we consider the final stake of the acquirer after the acquisition rather than the size of the acquired stake, then 9% of all acquisitions have a final stake of up to 10%, 24% have a final stake of 10% − 20%, 24% have a final stake of 20% − 30%, 21% have a final stake of 30% − 40%, and 22% have a final stake of 40% − 50%. The median size of the initial stake before the acquisition of an additional stake is around 13%. In Table 5 , we present results from estimating the same specification as in Column (2) in Table 2 , but now separately for each of the five size groups. The results show that in the year an LP is introduced, the effect on new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions is concentrated on acquisitions of a 10% − 20% stake in rivals, but not in other size groups. Stakes that are under 20% typically do not trigger merger notification and hence can go "under the radar." Clearly, colluding firms would prefer such stakes over larger stakes that do trigger merger notification and antitrust scrutiny.
Interestingly, we also find a significant effect for larger acquisitions of 40% − 50% two years after the introduction of an LP. It turns out that this effect is driven by MS acquisitions in the U.S.: once the U.S. is dropped from the sample, the effect disappears.
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We now turn to the question posed earlier: why is there an increase in the volume of MS 30 The U.S. adjusted their 1993 LP in 1995 (see Sovinsky and Helland (2012) ). Of the 1, 948 MS acquisitions which involve stakes of 40% − 50% (see Table 4 ), 202 are from the U.S.
acquisitions after an LP is introduced? Is this because, on average, firms acquire larger stakes in rivals, or because, on average, they acquire stakes in larger rivals? To provide an answer, we begin by studying the effect that the introduction of an LP has on the aggregate MS stake that firms acquire in domestic rivals. That is, the dependent variable now is the unweighted sum of all acquired stakes in country i and year t. For example, if there are two MS acquisitions in country i in year t, one of a 10% stake and the other of a 30% stake, then the aggregate stake size is 40%. The estimates, presented in Table A4 in the Appendix, suggest that despite the increase in the number and volume of domestic horizontal MS acquisitions, the introduction of an LP does not have a significant effect on the aggregate stake which is acquired (the effect is significant only in Column (1) where we do not control for financial covariates). Hence, the increase in the volume of MS acquisitions is not due to acquisitions of larger stakes once an LP is in place.
Having ruled out the possibility that firms acquire larger stakes, we now examine the possibility that once an LP is in place, firms acquire stakes in larger rivals. To this end, we measure the size of the target firms in terms of their market capitalization, which is defined as follows:
M arket Cap = 100 × Deal volume Acquired stake .
We then split the target firms into two groups, small and large, depending on whether their market capitalization is below or above the median of all target firms in their country. The results appear in Table 6 . The dependent variable is the number of MS acquisitions in small rivals in Columns (1)-(4) and in large rivals in Columns (5)-(8). Notes: S.E. clustered at the country-level. Inflation equation is reported in the online Appendix. All specifications include year and country fixed effects. The macroeconomic and financial covariates are as in Table 2 . * p<0.10; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01 Table 6 shows that in the year in which a national LP is introduced, there is a significant increase in the number of MS acquisitions in large rivals, but not in small ones. Columns (6)- (7) show that the effect is present only in countries with an effective antitrust enforcement and low levels of corruption. Column (8) shows that the effect is present only in the year in which the LP is introduced, but not in subsequent years. The finding that the introduction of an LP encourages acquisitions of stakes in large rivals is consistent with Hellwig and Hüschelrath (2016) , who find that large firms are often involved in cartel activity, and with Hoang et al. (2014), who find that large cartel members are most likely to become the chief witness under an LP. Unfortunately, we do not observe the size of the acquirers and therefore cannot investigate whether the introduction of LP also affects the acquirer's size.
Robustness Checks
We now report some robustness checks. We begin by looking at whether, beside its effect on new 
where DH is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the observation for a certain country-year pair refers to new horizontal domestic MS acquisition and 0 otherwise, and CG = 1 − DH. We then estimate this model separately for each type of a control group. The results regarding the number of new MS acquisitions are reported in Table 7 below. 31 In Column (1), the control group is DNH MS acquisitions, in Columns (2)- (3) it is CBH MS acquisitions, and in Columns (4)- (5) it is CBNH MS acquisitions. In the case of cross-border acquisitions, we examine separately cases in which the introduction of an LP is in the target's country (Columns (2) and (4)) and in which it is in the acquirer's country (Columns (3) and (5)).
The results show that the introduction of an LP has a significant effect only on domestic horizontal MS acquisitions, but not on other types of MS acquisitions. This finding is consistent with the idea that domestic horizontal MS acquisitions are driven, at least partly, by the desire to stabilize domestic collusive agreements. (2)- (5) of Table 2 . * p<0.10; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01
One might be concerned that our results are driven either by the large number of LP introductions in 2004 or by the fact that many MS acquisitions in our data come from three countries:
the U.S., Japan, and Spain. We therefore re-estimate Table 2 , but now drop from the sample MS acquisitions from the nine countries that introduced a national LP in 2004 (Belgium, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, South Africa and Switzerland). We then repeat the exercise by dropping from the sample MS acquisitions from the U.S., Japan, and Spain. The results, presented in Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix, show that our results are not driven by specific years or specific countries: the introduction of an LP still has a significant positive effect on domestic horizontal MS acquisitions in the year in which the LP is introduced but not in other years.
Finally, we ran a placebo test by assigning a random year for the introduction of a national LP for each country in the dataset. We repeat this procedure 1, 000 times to get 1, 000 randomized LP samples. For each sample, we run specification (2) of our baseline regressions presented in Tables   2-3 32 The concern is that MS acquisitions give rise to unilateral and coordinated anticompetitive effects. There is already some evidence that MS acquisitions may harm competition. The question of course is whether this is due to unilateral or coordinated effects.
In this paper, we study the latter possibility and examine whether MS acquisitions are likely to facilitate collusion. To this end, we exploit the fact that the introduction of an LP is a negative shock that destabilize collusive agreements. Firms may react to this negative shock by acquiring MS in rivals either in order to stabilize their collusive agreements, or to soften competition if collusion is going to break down. Consistent with this idea, we find that the introduction of an LP is followed by a significant increase in the number of MS acquisitions and in their volume. This effect is present however only in countries with an effective antitrust enforcement and low levels of corruption, where the introduction of an LP is indeed likely to destabilize collusive agreements. Moreover, we find that the increase in MS acquisitions is significant when it comes to large rivals (i.e., targets with abovemedian market capitalization) and when the acquisitions involve stakes of 10% − 20%. As mentioned earlier, typically such stakes do not trigger merger notification, and hence allows colluding firms to stay "under the radar."
As far as we know, our paper is the first to provide evidence for the collusive effect of MS acquisitions. While there is already a theoretical literature that shows that MS acquisitions can facilitate collusion, so far this possibility did not receive an empirical support. Our results suggest that MS acquisitions are potentially anticompetitive, especially when it comes to acquisitions of intermediate levels of MS stakes in large rivals and hence it would be a good idea to incorporate them into the merger control procedures, as is done, to some extent, in some countries like Austria, Germany, or the UK.
A Appendix
The following two tables report results from model choice tests suggesting which model should be prefered over another. In particular Poisson and Negative Binomial models as well as their zeroinflated counterparts are compared. In addition to the Akaike and the Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC and BIC, a lower value means a better model fit and should be preferred) we also report the Likelihood-Ratio (LRX2)) for nested models and the the Vuong Test for non-nested models. 
Data construction
The following table shows how we constructed the data set that we use in the paper and the number of observations that remained after each step. Cross country data Additional tables Table A6 shows ZINB estimations for the aggregate stake of new domestic MS acquisitions. Tables   A9-A10 are the counterparts of Tables 2 and 3 in the text, but in Table A9 we omit countries that introduced an LP in 2004, and in Table A10 we omit countries with the largest MS activity. 
